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Brussels – boss, bully or the big brother? 
Framing CONFLICT in contemporary Hungarian 
political rhetoric 
 
According to political realism, conflict is an immanent feature of world poli-
tics (Morgenthau 1948/1973). Drawing on this basic premise, it can be ex-
pected that the CONFLICT frame is routinely exploited by politicians to explain 
and justify their foreign policy (Musolff 2016). Conflict is especially preva-
lent in populist narratives, where the “pure people” are juxtaposed with the 
“corrupt elite” (Mudde 2004). Accordingly, we hypothesized that the current 
Hungarian populist government would also frame its turbulent relationship 
with the EU by metaphorically conceptualizing it as a violent conflict. Draw-
ing on a discourse dynamics approach to metaphor identification (Cameron et 
al. 2009; 2010), we analysed the metaphorical framing of the term Brüsszel 
(‘Brussels’) found in articles published on official government websites be-
tween 2015 and 2017. Our results indicate that explicit manifestation of the 
CONFLICT frame in the form of violent conflict (such as a military operation) 
is less prevalent in contemporary government rhetoric, as opposed to the EU 
AS PERSON frame. This latter conceptualization, however, is manifested by 
metaphorical scenarios that evoke conflictual relations with varying degrees 
(and thus feed into populist narratives) by making sense of the EU as an au-
thority figure, a partner in a joint venture, a bully, and an opponent in a battle.  
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1. Introduction 
On 12 April 2003, Hungary held its referendum on its accession to the European 
Union (EU); 83.76% of the voters approved the membership.1 Enthusiasm for the 
EU was also reflected in the attitude of the political parties, which, regardless of 
their ideology, fully supported Hungary’s EU membership, which eventually came 
into effect on 1 May 2004 (Fölsz & Tóka 2006; Dúró 2017). This positive stance 
has changed considerably over time; current attitudes toward the EU are definitely 
more ambiguous. For instance, the 2018 Eurobarometer survey recorded a mere 
48% trust for the European Union among the Hungarian population. On a political 
level, EU and Hungary relations have also been turbulent in the past few years, due 
to a number of conflicts relating to economic, societal, and political issues (such as 
the privatisation of the private pension funds or the recent refugee problem).2 EU–
Hungary tensions have surfaced in governmental communication as well: research 
indicates that governmental communication has been adopting a clear “Them” (the 
EU) versus “Us” (Hungary) conceptualization in official communication since 
2014 (Koller 2017). 
Yet how exactly – i.e., with what linguistic means – does the Hungarian gov-
ernment frame its relationship with the EU? The question is all the more relevant in 
light of the fact that political realism takes conflict in politics as granted (Morgen-
thau 1948/1973). Drawing on this basic premise, it can be expected that the CON-
FLICT frame – particularly in the form of a violent conflict, such as a military opera-
tion or even war – is routinely exploited by politicians to explain and justify their 
foreign policy (Musolff 2016). The ubiquity of framing political conflict as war has 
been widely researched both in communication theory (e.g., Semetko & Valken-
burg 2000) and in conceptual metaphor theory (e.g., Lakoff 1991; Mio 1997; Mu-
solff 2016); research in both fields has implied that the use of the CONFLICT frame 
rests on generic conceptualizations and is widely applied across cultures. Its appli-
cation is especially prevalent in populist narratives, where the “pure people” are 
juxtaposed with the “corrupt elite” (Mudde 2004). Building on the assumption that 
conflict is thus a staple element of political communication in general and populist 
                                                 
1 Retrieved from: https://valtor.valasztas.hu/valtort/jsp/orszjkv.jsp?EA=20&W=9. Accessed: 25 
September 2020. 
2 For a detailed account of the EU–Hungary relationship, see Arató & Koller (2015).  
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discourse in particular, the aim of the present paper is to shed light on how the rul-
ing Hungarian populist government communicates about the EU, when referring to 
– metaphorically and metonymically speaking – the very seat and heart of the Eu-
ropean Union, i.e., Brussels. The Central Eastern European region has a rather 
unique attitude towards the EU in the sense that even though these countries “are 
among the most pro-EU publics on the continent, they vote for some of the most 
Eurosceptical governments. These governments, in turn, use Brussels as a rhetori-
cal punching bag while benefitting from its financial largess” (Krastev 2018: 52; 
cited in Csehi & Zigut 2020: 2; emphasis ours). Keeping in mind that Central and 
Eastern Europe is still considered as an under-researched area in populism studies 
(Csehi & Zigut 2020), the paper aims to fill in some gaps with regard to the link 
between metaphorical framing and populist discourse.   
In what follows, Section 2 outlines the political context that has led to a strained 
relationship between Hungary and the European Union. Section 3 discusses the 
significance of metaphorical framing in political communication, while Section 4 
outlines the methodology and corpus selection. Section 5 discusses the data. Final-
ly, Section 6 concludes by outlining the main findings of the paper. 
2. The European Union and Hungary – the bigger context  
Hungary submitted its application for membership on 1 April 1994 in Athens and 
joined the EU ten years later. During the years leading to the country’s full mem-
bership, Hungary was considered as one of the forerunners of accession among the 
former communist states (Human Rights Watch 2002; Tuka 2009; Buzogány 2017). 
As noted above, Hungary’s entry to the European Union was widely supported by 
both the public and the political parties, regardless of the parties’ political ideology 
(Fölsz & Tóka 2006). Eventually, with the support of 83.76% of the votes, Hungary 
joined the EU on 1 May 2004. However, the initial positive attitude towards the 
European Union changed over the following years due to a number of reasons (and 
heavily politicized topics). It is not our aim here to discuss in detail how exactly the 
EU–Hungary relationship shifted (as this is not the main focus of the paper). In the 
following we will provide a select overview of some of the major issues that sur-
faced during the time frame leading up to the tensions between 2015 and 2017 – 
and which period falls under scrutiny in the present research.  
One of the major conflicts between the Hungarian government and the EU sur-
faced in the summer of 2010, when the EU did not allow Hungary to extend the 
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presidency of the Council of the EU, further disagreements arose, especially around 
the new Hungarian media law, which curtailed free press and the media (Human 
Rights Watch 2015; cf. Bayer 2011), and the newly accepted constitution. The in-
troduction of the new Fundamental Law sparked heavy international criticism (also 
from outside the EU, such as the United Nations), due to its failure to maintain a 
sufficient level of checks and balances between the legislative and executive pow-
ers and for curbing the power of the Constitutional Court. The document was also 
criticized for the lack of public debate before its adoption (note that even the Hun-
garian Parliament was given merely a month to formulate its opinion; Scheppele 
2015).  
Tensions between the European Union and Hungary manifested in government 
rhetoric as well. According to Koller (2017: 172), a significant turn in this respect 
can be detected in the 2014 EU parliamentary campaign, in which the main mes-
sage was to determine Hungary as “Us”, as opposed to the EU, which was framed 
as “Them”. This “Us” versus “Them” attitude came to the forefront in the billboard 
campaign that the government initiated in 2014, which ran with the following mes-
sage: “This is the message we’re sending to Brussels: More respect for Hungari-
ans!” This alienation was further exacerbated by the subsequent refugee problem 
that reached its peak in Hungary in the summer and autumn of 2015 (Bocskor 
2018; Benczes 2019), after which Hungary initiated its referendum on migration in 
2016. 
3. Metaphorical framing and political communication 
Frames have made their appearance in a host of disciplines, including artificial in-
telligence (Minsky 1975), psychology (Kahneman & Tversky 1984), semantics 
(Fillmore 1982/2006) cognitive linguistics (Lakoff 1986), or communication theory 
(Entman 1993). While the focus on – and the exact definition of – what a frame is 
does differ across disciplines, the fundamental characteristic of a frame as a means 
of structuring and organizing the world around us via stable cognitive representa-
tions can be regarded as a common feature. Thus, acting as “a portion of back-
ground information” (Semino et al. 2016: 1), frames a) are focused on a particular 
aspect of the world; b) generate expectations and inferences; and c) are also typi-
cally linked with specific lexical choices (Semino et al. 2016). Frames are thus very 
much embedded in language use (Fillmore 1982/2006; Kövecses 2006; Semino et 
al. 2016) – what words we use to describe a particular situation can evoke alterna-
tive frames (i.e., different interpretations) and accordingly result in alternative as-
sumptions (i.e., prompt different reactions).  
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In this paper we focus on metaphorical framing specifically, since metaphors 
have been considered as “prototypical initiators of framing” (Krippendorff 2017: 
97). Accordingly, the choice of one specific metaphor in communication over an-
other may influence the way we perceive a specific issue (Thibodeau & Boroditsky 
2011). By way of illustration, Lakoff (2014: 1–2) analyses the framing of taxation 
by the administration of George W. Bush. Under Bush’s presidency, the White 
House started communicating about a tax relief, based on the conceptual metaphor 
TAXATION IS AN AFFLICTION (Lakoff 2014). The metaphorical expression tax relief 
evoked a frame consisting of elements as the affliction itself, the act of relieving 
someone from affliction and the parties involved. Hence, the TAX RELIEF frame en-
sured that taxation was viewed from a particular viewpoint, one that regarded taxa-
tion as negative and tax cuts as necessary (Lakoff 2014). 
The example of tax relief not only demonstrates the significance of metaphors in 
framing in general but also highlights one of the areas that has received special at-
tention in cognitive linguistic research: political communication. Although cogni-
tive linguistic studies have relied on metaphorical framing as a tool to analyse the 
way we conceptualise topics related to health (Semino et al. 2016; Brdar & Brdar-
Szabó herein), finance (López & Lopis 2010; Benczes & Benczes 2018) and socie-
ty (Burgers et al. 2016), metaphorical framing has possibly been the most exten-
sively utilized in the examination of political discourse (cf. Lakoff 2002; Musolff 
2016; Burgers et al. 2019; Musolff herein). Metaphorical framing is relevant to po-
litical communication on multiple levels. Firstly, political actors regularly adopt 
metaphors to support their arguments (Charteris-Black 2018), as, for instance, for-
mer British prime minister Harold Macmillan referred to the independence move-
ments of former British colonies as the “wind of change” (Charteris-Black 2018: 
250). Metaphorical frames also ensure that complex areas of politics, such as eco-
nomic processes or legal issues, can be presented to the public in a comprehensible 
manner (Mio 1997; Musolff 2016; Charteris-Black 2018). This aspect of metaphor-
ical framing is crucial because understanding specific processes of politics, as the 
above discussed taxation system, would require expert knowledge. However, the 
use of metaphorical language makes these issues accessible to laypeople as well 
(cf. Musolff 2016; Charteris-Black 2018). 
These aspects of metaphorical frames are relevant to the political rhetoric of the 
current Hungarian government as well. Framing the relationship between Hungary 
and the EU through metaphors facilitates the interpretation of the complex func-
tioning of the European Union and its authorities over the member states in a more 
simplex manner. Moreover, metaphorical framing enables the Hungarian govern-




Réka Benczes – Lilla Petronella Szabó: 
Brussels – boss, bully or the big brother? 
Framing CONFLICT in contemporary Hungarian political rhetoric 
government and is in line with its populist policies (and narratives) (Csehi & Zigut 
2020). Thus, it can be reasonably hypothesised that the Hungarian government also 
relies primarily on the CONFLICT frame to conceptualize its relationship with the 
European Union.    
Given Hungary’s turbulent and rather ambivalent relationship to the EU (see 
Section 2 above), it can also be expected that the CONFLICT frame is manifested in 
governmental communication in the form of a violent conflict, i.e., WAR. Needless 
to say, the latter conceptualization has been widely applied in the field of political 
metaphors. In fact, it has appeared in several forms and in numerous contexts in the 
course of history (Lakoff 1991; Mio 1997; Musolff 2016). One of the most widely 
cited examples of politics as war is the “War on Terror”; its emergence can be con-
nected to the terrorist attack against the United States on 11 September 2001, after 
which the US president, George W. Bush, used this expression to sum up the for-
eign policy of the US. The framing of the war against Iraq as such was so powerful 
that it was adopted by the media largely without any criticism, which resulted in 
the justification and legitimization of the invasion of Iraq (Lewis & Reece 2009).3  
Political discourse thus relies on metaphorical frames to communicate, justify, 
and legitimize policies (Lakoff 2002; Charteris-Black 2011). Yet metaphorical 
frames are often schematic – they become elaborated through discourse. Musolff 
(2016: 30) refers to these elaborations as “scenarios”. In his definition, scenarios 
“are a less schematic subtype of frame insofar as they include specific narrative and 
evaluative perspectives, which make them attractive for drawing strong inferences 
in political discourses” (Musolff 2016: 30). Scenarios are thus different from 
frames in the sense that they are built upon the beliefs of communities, and involve 
prototypical elements such as participants, storylines – i.e., a narrative. If we wish 
to incorporate Musolff’s views into our research, some adjustment needs to be 
made to the hypothesis of the present paper. It is thus expected that the current 
Hungarian government will frame its relationship with the EU through the meta-
phor of CONFLICT, which is manifested predominantly via the scenario of WAR. 
                                                 
3 Note that terrorism has not been the only issue that has been captured with the WAR domain in US 
politics. Lyndon B. Johnson’s policies in the 1960s, which aimed to reduce poverty in the United 
States, were referred to as the “War on Poverty” (Zarefsky 2005). Later, under his presidency, Rich-
ard Nixon called for the “War on Drugs,” which grew into an intensive campaign against drug use 
through the 1980s and the 1990s (Steuter & Wills 2008). 
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4. Methodology 
The aim of our study was to explore the way the Hungarian government conceptu-
alizes a single target domain, when referring to the very seat and heart of the Euro-
pean Union, i.e., Brussels. To do so, we selected one specific context, articles pub-
lished on the official website of the Hungarian government4 and the Prime Minis-
ter’s Office.5 In other words, we looked for metaphors in the local setting of gov-
ernmental communication (cf. Stanojević 2019). Initially, our aim was to collect all 
the available texts from when Viktor Orbán’s party, FIDESZ, first came into power 
in 2010 (note that FIDESZ is now in its third consecutive term as a ruling party, 
most recently winning the 2018 general elections with a two-thirds majority). 
However, we could not extract comparable datasets between 2010 and 2014 due to 
the very small sample sizes. Thus, we restricted our investigation to articles pub-
lished between 1 January 2015 and 31 December 2017, as these three consecutive 
years – 2015, 2016, and 2017 – provided adequate data. Following the extraction of 
all government communication from the investigated years, we then searched for 
the keyword Brüsszel (‘Brussels’) in the raw corpus. The reason why we selected 
Brüsszel as keyword, and not Európai Unió or EU (the Hungarian counterpart of 
European Union and EU, respectively) is that Brüsszel has become a conventional-
ised expression for the European Union6 through the CAPITAL FOR GOVERNMENT 
metonymy in Hungarian political discourse (cf. Brdar & Brdar-Szabó 2011; Csehi 
2019: 1018). Note also that the ruling Hungarian party, FIDESZ, based its anti-
immigration propaganda against the European Union in 2016 and 2017 by “ad-
dressing” its messages to Brüsszel (see Benczes 2019). As observed by Brdar and 
Brdar-Szabó (2011), the use of the CAPITAL FOR GOVERNMENT metonymy (i.e., the 
use of Brüsszel instead of Európai Unió in our case) implies (and entails) emotion-
al attachment via the EMOTIONAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE metaphor and is 
thus well suited to carry emotionally heated messages that feed into populist prop-
aganda.      
We selected all the sentences in which we found the word Brüsszel. We did not 
take into consideration examples in which Brüsszel unequivocally referred to the 
city of Brussels (i.e., as a physical location). A representative example is provided 
in (1):  
                                                 
4 Available at: http://www.kormany.hu. Accessed: 25 September 2020. 
5 Available at: http://www.miniszterelnok.hu. Accessed: 25 September 2020. 
6 Note that the CAPITAL FOR GOVERNMENT metonymy involving Brussels and the European Union is 
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(1) A  hét végén európai  uniós  csúcs          (2016) 7 
the week end.at  European Union summit 
lesz  Brüsszelben                  
will.be Brussels.in 
‘There will be a European Union summit in Brussels at the end of the 
week’ 
We also excluded examples where Brüsszel was used metonymically to refer to 
the people working in any one the EU’s institutions (by way of the INSTITUTION 
FOR THE PEOPLE WORKING THERE metonymy), since the focus of the present paper is 
the metaphorical framing of the EU. Such cases are exemplified by (2).  
(2) A  konferenciánkon  is  elhangzott az  a   vélemény,  (2015) 
the conference.our.on also voiced  that the  opinion   
hogy  Brüsszelből sokan úgy állnak   a  közép-európai 
that  Brussels.from many  so  approach.they  the Central European 
országokhoz, hogy „kaptok  tőlünk  pénzt, ezért ne  nagyon 
countries.to that ‘get.you  us.from  money, so  not much 
szóljatok   bele abba,   amit  csinálunk” 
interfere.you  in  the.thing that  do.we’ 
‘The opinion was voiced at our conference that many people from Brus-
sels have the ‘you get money from us, so do not interfere very much in 
what we do’ attitude towards Central European countries’ 
In sum, we identified 433 tokens (valid examples with the word Brüsszel) in the 
texts extracted between 2015 and 2017.8  
We opted for a discourse dynamics approach to metaphor identification as our 
methodology (Cameron et al. 2009; 2010) – i.e., no metaphorical frames were set 
up in advance. We followed the steps of metaphor identification as proposed by 
Cameron et al. (2009; 2010). The process is illustrated by example (3): 
(3) A  kérdések  olyan  témákra  vonatkoznak,  amelyekben  (2017) 
the  questions  such  topics  related.to,  about.which 
Magyarországnak vitája  van  Brüsszellel. 
Hungary    debate has  Brussels.with 
‘The questions relate to topics about which Hungary has an argument 
                                                 
7 The glossing of the examples will be kept relatively simple.  
8 In numbers: 52 tokens from 2015; 210 tokens from 2016; and 171 tokens from 2017. 
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with Brussels’ 
Firstly, we identified linguistic metaphors, which can be both words and 
phrases. We marked Magyarországnak vitája van Brüsszellel ‘Hungary has an ar-
gument with Brussels’ as metaphorical on the basis that according to the Concise 
Explanatory Dictionary of Hungarian (CEDH; Pusztai 2011), vita ‘argument’ can 
unfold only between persons but not institutions or collectives (as in this case Hun-
gary metonymically stands for the Hungarian people/government and Brussels 
stands for the EU). The discourse dynamic approach locates metaphor vehicles9 
first, such as has an argument with. The metaphor vehicles are then grouped to-
gether based on the semantics of their basic meaning; accordingly, has an argu-
ment with constituted the same group as the highlighted items in examples (4) and 
(5) (‘accord’ and ‘standpoint’, respectively): 
(4) nincs   összhang Budapest és  Brüsszel  között    (2017) 
there.is.no  accord  Budapest and Brussels  between 
‘there is no accord between Budapest and Brussels’ 
(5) nem fogadjuk el  Brüsszel  álláspontját         (2016) 
no  accept.we  Brussels’ standpoint 
‘we do not accept Brussel’s standpoint’ 
Each of these vehicle terms imply that there is a difference of opinion between 
the two parties, i.e., Hungary/Budapest and Brussels. Cameron et al. (2009; 2010) 
recommend that vehicles should be labelled with the least possible generalization 
from the word or phrase which appears in the data. Therefore, we selected the OP-
PONENT IN AN ARGUMENT label for the examples which include words or phrases 
explicitly stating that there is an argument between Hungary/Budapest and Brus-
sels. It must be added that these groupings are created along the notion of “princi-
pled flexibility,” i.e., the sets of groupings are subject to change as the researchers 
work through the whole corpus (Cameron et al. 2009; 2010).   
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Major metaphorical frames 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the major metaphorical frames we have identi-
fied.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of major metaphorical frames, 2015–2017 
As can be seen from Figure 1, The EU AS PERSON emerged as the most frequent 
metaphorical conceptualization in our data, accounting for approximately 90% of 
the tokens in the corpus for each investigated year.10This result is by no means sur-
prising; political communication often relies on the use of metaphors that concep-
tualise a political entity, such as a nation, as a person (cf. Stanojević & Šarić 2019 
for a recent overview on the NATION AS PERSON metaphor). According to Charteris-
Black (2011: 61), depicting a political establishment, such as the European Union 
as a person, has significant persuasive power, because “it evokes our attitudes, feel-
ings and beliefs about people and applies them to our attitudes, feelings and beliefs 
about abstract political entities”. Personification thus provides direct emotional at-
tachment to an otherwise abstract entity (Šarić 2015; Demata 2019). Hence, reduc-
ing (and simplifying) the complex institution of the European Union to a single 
person with its own idiosyncratic features, who can be held accountable for its ac-
tions, can make it easier to get a particular message across (Semino 2008). 
The PERSON metaphor can be organized into units of human society, such as 
FAMILY, as in the case of the NATION AS FAMILY metaphor (Kövecses 2017). In the 
                                                 
10 We also managed to establish a number of varied metaphorical conceptualizations that had a rela-
tively low distribution in the investigated period, including the conceptualization of the EU via an 
image schematic FORCE frame, or via a MACHINE or PUZZLE metaphor. These frames have been 
grouped under the category of “Other” in Figure 1 (and due to their low occurrences will not be dis-
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context of politics, this metaphor is typically built on models that originate in either 
parent – child relations (as discussed by Lakoff 2002 in the context of US politics), 
or in marital relations (as shown by Musolff 2011 in his analysis of how the Ger-
man and British press frame the relationship between EU member states). Howev-
er, in our data, evident family relations did not emerge at all as a possible concep-
tualization of Hungary and EU relations, despite their definite presence in political 
communication. One possible explanation might be the intention of FIDESZ (and 
the Hungarian government) to maintain a distance between Hungary and the EU 
(Brussels). Accordingly, Brussels is represented as an active agent through the CAP-
ITAL FOR GOVERNMENT metonymy, but this personification is not extended to famil-
ial relations at all.  
Following the discourse dynamics-based metaphor identification procedure, we 
were able to categorize the vast majority of the tokens along four distinct meta-
phorical scenarios that conceptualise Brussels as an AUTHORITY FIGURE, a PARTNER, 
a BULLY, and an OPPONENT IN A BATTLE. The distribution of the four major scenarios 
of the EU AS PERSON frame is depicted in Figure 2. As can be seen in the figure, all 
four identified metaphorical scenarios showed a relatively even trend in the inves-
tigated period. The most frequent scenario in our corpus was the AUTHORITY FIG-
URE, amounting to more than half of the data in each consecutive year (59% in 











Figure 2. Distribution of identified metaphorical scenarios within the EU AS PER-
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The PARTNER scenario accounted for approximately a quarter of the EU AS PERSON 
instantiations (21%, 24%, and 24%, respectively). The BULLY scenario appeared as 
the third most common manifestation of the EU AS PERSON frame (with 12%, 11%, 
and 18%, respectively).Quite surprisingly, and against our initial expectations, the 
OPPONENT IN A BATTLE scenario was the least frequently used narrative in govern-
ment communication (accounting for less than ten per cent of the data within the 
EU AS PERSON frame in each investigated year).   
At this point it might be argued that our main assumption concerning the con-
flict-obsessed political rhetoric of the current Hungarian populist government has 
not been confirmed by the above data. After all, only one of the metaphorical sce-
narios, OPPONENT IN A BATTLE, is explicitly and evidently based upon conflict (and 
a rather violent form of it). Yet, we wish to maintain that conflict is indeed a neces-
sary and elementary feature of the political communication of the Hungarian gov-
ernment concerning Brussels. What we wish to show in the forthcoming sections is 
that it is present in all four identified narratives, but its intensity does vary from 
scenario to scenario. In the following sections we will discuss each scenario in 
more detail (in descending order of their overall frequency).     
5.2. The AUTHORITY FIGURE scenario 
The most frequent type of metaphorical scenario that emerged in our data concep-
tualized the European Union as an AUTHORITY FIGURE: as indicated in Figure 2, its 
ratio was 59% in 2015, 56% in 2016, and 49% in 2017. In this particular conceptu-
alization the relationship between Hungary and the EU is based upon a hierarchical 
model, which assumes Brussels to be in the position of the decision maker. This 
model reflects the supranational principle in EU politics. Importantly, this arrange-
ment does not imply that Brussels is an authoritarian figure. Brussels asserts its will 
and decisions on Hungary because it is entitled to do so, as it possesses recognized 
authority (Osorio-Kupferblum 2015). This aspect was expressed in the tokens by 
virtue of modals, such as kell (‘must’) – as in example (6): 
(6) akkor  arról  tájékoztatni kell Brüsszelt           (2015) 
then  about   inform.to  must Brussels 
‘then [Hungary] must inform Brussels’ 
Further lexical items that we considered as activating the AUTHORITY FIGURE 
scenario included szembe megy (‘to go against’), eldönt (‘to decide’), módosíthat 
(‘to modify’), elvehet (‘to take away [a right]’), beleszól (‘to intervene’), hozzájárul 
(‘to consent’), etc., as in example (7): 
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(7) Megjegyezte: a   Déli   Áramlat gázvezetéket ugyan    (2016) 
remarked.he the South Stream gas.pipeline though  
Brüsszel egyelőre   megvétózta, de mindkét ország érdeke, 
Brussels temporarily vetoed    but both  country interest.of 
hogy  előbb-utóbb  meglegyen a  vezeték.  
that sooner.or.later  be.finished the pipeline 
‘He remarked: the South Stream gas pipeline was vetoed by Brussels for 
the moment but it is in the interest of both countries to finish the pipeline 
sooner or later’ 
Since the European Union is bestowed with certain rights, under the AUTHORITY 
capacity there is no coercion or force involved. Nevertheless, Brussels (in its ca-
pacity as an authority) can punish Hungary, when it deems this to be necessary. Ex-
ample (8) illustrates this particular case: 
(8) Brüsszel  kötelezettségszegési eljárást  indít   majd     (2017) 
Brussels  infringement   procedure launch  then 
‘Brussels will launch an infringement procedure’ 
Under the AUTHORITY scenario, conflict between the EU and Hungary can arise 
due to the EU’s higher position in the hierarchy, i.e., that it has the right to control 
(and even decide in) certain issues affecting Hungary. As it is shown in example 
(7), the fact that Brussels has such a level of authority allows it to block certain ini-
tiatives of the member states. Yet another aspect that may lead to discord is related 
to the EU’s assumed lack of competence to fulfil its responsibilities; our corpus re-
turned a number of hits where Brussels was criticized for not protecting the Euro-
pean people from “illegal migrants” and that it is Brussel’s “failure” that the United 
Kingdom left the European Union. The reference to Brussel’s incompetence is ex-
emplified in (9): 
(9) Brüsszel nem képes  megszervezni Európa  védelmét, de   (2016) 
Brussels not capable organize.to  Europe defence,  but  
ennél  is  nagyobb  baj   hogy  a   szándék  is  
even   also bigger  problem  that the intention also 
hiányzik belőle  
missing from.it 
‘Brussels is not capable of organizing Europe’s defence, but it is a bigger 
problem that it does not even have the intention to do so’ 
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higher position in the hierarchy and its incompetence to perform its tasks and du-
ties. 
5.3. The PARTNER scenario 
The PARTNER IN A JOINT VENTURE scenario is based upon an egalitarian model. 
Here, Hungary and the European Union are conceptualised as partners with equal 
rights and mutual obligations, bringing into focus the intergovernmental principle 
of the European Union (as opposed to the supranational principle that is empha-
sized by the AUTHORITY scenario). Accordingly, in most of the examples that fell 
into this category, Hungary and the EU were conceptualized as partners in a discus-
sion (or argument), and both parties were able to express their views and interests – 
even if these conflicted. In other words, the CONFLICT frame emerged very subtly, 
in the form of debates and/or arguments, as in example (10): 
(10) megkezdődött a vita Brüsszel és  Magyarország között (2016) 
started the debate  Brussels and  Hungary between 
‘the debate has started between Brussels and Hungary’ 
Lexical items that – in our view – prompted for such a scenario included vita 
(‘argument’), vitában áll (‘to be in an argument’), mond (‘to say’), elmagyaráz (‘to 
explain’), javasol (‘to suggest’), álláspontot elfogad (‘to accept a position’), nem 
ért egyet (‘to disagree’), véleményt képvisel (‘to represent an opinion’), ellentmond 
(‘to contradict’), etc. – as illustrated in examples (11–13). 
(11) Most várjuk,  hogy mi  fog történni,  Brüsszel     (2015) 
now wait.we  that what will happen.to  Brussels 
összehív-e  újabb  tanácskozást  
convene.if newer council 
‘Now, we are waiting for what will happen, whether Brussels will convene 
a new council...’ 
(12) Brüsszel  hivatalos javaslata (2016) 
Brussels  official  proposal.of 
‘Brussel’s official proposal’ 
(13) kell egy értelmes   munkamegosztást kialakítani    (2017) 
must one reasonable   division.of.labour establish.to   
Brüsszel  és  a  nemzetállamok  között 
Brussels  and the nation-states   between 
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‘a reasonable division of labour must be established between Brussels and 
nation states’ 
Examples (10–13) demonstrate that within the PARTNER scenario (as compared 
to the above discussed AUTHORITY scenario) the two parties, i.e., the European Un-
ion and Hungary are not in a hierarchical relationship, since Brussels and Hungary 
can debate issues in the respective bodies of the EU. Thus, Brussels can make rec-
ommendations to the member states – which is a far less radical intervention in pol-
icymaking as compared to vetoing (see example 7). Nevertheless, as reflected in 
example (13), the “division of labour” is not clarified in every single case, which 
can lead to discord. Thus, similarly to the AUTHORITY scenario, conflict emerges 
from the nature of the partnership itself: in a “business relationship” certain issues 
must be discussed, and – inevitably – conflicting interests collide. 
As reflected in Figure 2, the number of tokens reflecting the egalitarian model 
has shown a slight increase over the course of the investigated period. While only 
21% of the tokens within the EU AS PERSON frame activated the egalitarian model in 
2015, their ratio increased to 24% in 2016 and in 2017. It is not within the bounds 
of the present paper to hypothesize about the possible reasons behind this overall 
increase; nevertheless, some observations on the basis of the data can be drawn. 
Any such change in the ratio of the PARTNER scenario needs to take into account the 
ratio of the other scenarios. It is also evident from Figure 2 that over the investigat-
ed period the AUTHORITY FIGURE scenario decreased, from 59% in 2015 to 49% in 
2017, which might signify a less confrontative and more collaborative relationship 
in 2017 as compared to 2015.11 However, any such implication might also be a re-
sult of the nature of the database that we used – the official websites that we used 
for data collection (which also have an English version) might choose to focus on 
the collaborative nature of Hungary’s relations with the EU (thus promoting the 
success of the government), instead of highlighting evident conflict and discord.  
 
5.4. The BULLY scenario 
The EU AS BULLY scenario emerged as the third most common narrative in the gov-
ernment’s communication about the EU. This scenario is based upon a totalitarian 
model, according to which the EU is regarded as an authoritarian figure that threat-
ens Hungary’s wellbeing and curbs the country’s essential rights. In this respect, 
this scenario can also be regarded as a less subtle manifestation of the CONFLICT 
                                                 
11 Due to the small sample size, no firm conclusion can be drawn with respect to the statistical 
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frame; by conceptualizing the EU as a bully, the Hungarian government can frame 
the country as a victim who has been subject to unlawful aggression. While both 
the AUTHORITY FIGURE and the BULLY scenario are somewhat similar in the sense 
that both assume a hierarchical relationship between the EU and Hungary, there is 
nevertheless one crucial difference between them: in the case of the BULLY narra-
tive, the EU possesses the power (and also uses this power) to make its members 
do things they would otherwise not be willing to do.  
We considered tokens containing lexical items such as betilt (‘to prohibit’), 
erőltet (‘to force’), kényszerít (‘to coerce’), elvesz (‘to take away’), fenyeget (‘to 
threaten’), etc. to activate the BULLY scenario, as illustrated in examples (14) and 
(15): 
(14) kritizáljuk  azt  az  új  bevándorlási  szabályozást,    (2015) 
criticise.we  that the new immigration  regulation 
amelyet Brüsszel  próbál ráerőltetni  Magyarországra   
which Brussels  try   force.upon.to  Hungary.on 
és  a  többi országra 
and the other  countries.on 
‘we criticize the new immigration regulation, which Brussels is trying 
force upon Hungary and the other countries’ 
(15) Nem hagyhatjuk, hogy Brüsszel  a   törvények fölé    (2016) 
no  let.can.us that Brussels  the  laws    above 
helyezze  magát      
place   itself  
‘We cannot let Brussels place itself above the law’ 
Examples (14–15) demonstrate the cases when – according to the governmental 
communication – the EU attempted to “cross the line” and abuse its authority by 
placing itself “above the law.” Moreover, example (14) suggests that Brussels does 
not refrain from “forcing” its will upon the member states.  
Generally, and as depicted in Figure 2, the percentage of the BULLY scenario ex-
hibited an irregular (though relatively low) trend, with 12% in 2015, 11% in 2016, 
and 18% in 2017. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to put forth any con-
clusions as to why the BULLY scenario showed such irregularities, but on closer in-
spection it can be safely stated that the BULLY scenario was restricted to nearly ex-
clusively those tokens where the topic was (im)migration. Thus, the erratic nature 
of this particular scenario might simply be a reflection of the thematization of is-
 
 
               
21.3 (2020): 345-369 
361
sues on the government websites (i.e., there were less (im)migration-themed arti-
cles in 2015 and 2016 as compared to 2017). Yet definite conclusions could only be 
drawn by analysing all the articles that were published on the websites during the 
investigated period (which was not within the scope of the present research) and by 
having an adequately large sample size that allows testing for statistical signifi-
cance. 
5.5. The OPPONENT scenario 
Given the dominance of the WAR frame in political communication on the one 
hand, and Hungary’s tumultuous relationship with the EU on the other hand, we in-
itially assumed (and hypothesized) at the start of this research that the Hungarian 
government’s rhetoric concerning the EU would also heavily draw on the source 
domain of WAR, implying that the EU would be conceptualized as an enemy or op-
ponent in a battle. Yet, as the results in Figure 2 indicate, the preponderance of such 
tokens was relatively low – even though they remained at a very even level of be-
tween eight and nine per cent in each investigated year (8%, 9%, and 9%, respec-
tively). In this particular conceptualization, the EU is evidently and straightfor-
wardly conceptualized as an opponent in a military operation. Lexical items within 
the tokens that indicated this particular framing included megtámad (‘to attack’), 
ellenáll (‘to resist’), támadás (‘attack’), csata (‘battle’), küzdelem (‘fight’) and 
frontot nyit (‘to open a front’), as illustrated with examples (16–17): 
(16) nem  mi  akarjuk megváltoztatni a   mostani rendszert, (2016) 
not  we want.we change.to   the  current system 
hanem Brüsszel, tehát ők  kinyitottak egy frontot, és  
but  Brussels  thus they  opened  a  front    and 
nincs   mese, fel kell  venni  a  vértjeinket meg a   
there.is.no tale on  must  put.to the armor.our and the  
sisakot 
helmet 
‘it is Brussels, who wants to change the current system, not us; thus, they 
opened a front, so the time is up: we must put on our armours and the 
helmet’ 
(17) Vállalja-e  a   küzdelmet Brüsszellel  szemben?      (2017) 
accept.if  the fight   Brussels.with against 
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In all of these examples that we identified as belonging to the EU AS OPPONENT 
IN A BATTLE scenario, Brussels or the EU was regarded unequivocally as an enemy 
in a battle,12 and Hungary was actually taking part in a battle or fight against this 
opponent. In this particular scenario, the focus is on violent military conflict. Ex-
amples (16–17) might indicate that it was relatively straightforward to identify and 
classify tokens as belonging to this particular narrative. This, however, was not ex-
actly the case. Needless to say, the source domain of WAR is also often applied to 
the target domain of ARGUMENT (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 2003), and there were a few 
tokens in our corpus where it was difficult to maintain a difference between the EU 
AS AN OPPONENT IN AN ARGUMENT or the EU AS AN OPPONENT IN A BATTLE. In other 
words, the argument (or conflict) with the EU was metaphorically understood as a 
battle (or war), as exemplified by (18): 
(18) Mintha a  „van-e jogunk a  saját döntésünkhöz    (2016) 
As.if  the have.if right  the own decision.to  
vitát” vívnánk   Brüsszellel  is  
debate fight.would  Brussels.with too 
‘As if we were fighting the ‘do we have a right to decide for ourselves ar-
gument’ with Brussels too’13 
However, the focus of the present research is on how the EU (Brussels) is con-
ceptualized, and not how arguments are metaphorically understood. Thus, we even-
tually decided to classify tokens that contained the lexical item vita (‘argument’) or 
vitázik (‘to argue’) as belonging under the PARTNER scenario, even if there were 
hints of the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor in the token (as in the case of example 18) 
– on account of the fact that arguments can only be “fought” with people, even if 
the nature of this argument draws on the image of a battle or fight.  
What the trends analysed above indicate is that it is on the scenario level – and 
not the frame level – that a couple of observations can be drawn regarding the pre-
sent research. First and foremost, our assumption that governmental communica-
tion would be primarily based on the CONFLICT frame in the form of violent mili-
tary operation (i.e., war), in which case the EU is conceptualized as an opponent in 
a battle, was not confirmed, as the OPPONENT IN BATTLE scenario was the least fre-
                                                 
12 Such a conceptualization can also be analyzed as being metonymical in the sense that Brussels as 
an enemy is a whole standing for the parts (i.e., the soldiers), in which case the soldiers are the bu-
reaucrats and/or politicians in the organization as such. 
13 Note that the expression vitát vív (‘fight an argument’) is very unconventional in Hungarian, ques-
tioning to some degree the validity of the token itself. 
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quent narrative in every single year that we analysed. It was, in fact, the EU AS AU-
THORITY FIGURE conceptualization, based on a hierarchical model, that emerged as 
the most frequent scenario, accounting for more than 50% of the data. Such a hier-
archical relationship does not come without its conflicts – as demonstrated by the 
examples, discord in this particular scenario could be traced either to Hungary’s re-
sistance to EU authority (i.e., a clash of interests between the parties) or to the EU’s 
perceived lack of competence to safeguard the wellbeing of the member states. 
This particular point brings us to our second observation: the conflictual nature of 
all the four scenarios that we identified. Conflict manifested itself in the scenarios 
to varying degrees – quite explicitly and straightforwardly in the case of the OPPO-
NENT IN A BATTLE and the BULLY scenarios, and in more subtle terms in the AUTHOR-
ITY FIGURE and the PARTNER scenarios.  
This brings us to our third observation with regard to the results of the study. In 
the context of politics, the NATION AS PERSON metaphor has been typically linked 
with models that originate in either parent–child relations (as discussed by Lakoff 
2002 in the context of US politics), or in marital relations (as shown by Musolff 
2011). However, in our data, evident family relations did not emerge at all as a pos-
sible conceptualization of Hungary and EU relations, indicating the intention of 
FIDESZ (and the Hungarian government) to signal Hungary’s estrangement with 
the EU. Such a discourse promotes the “anti-imperialist rhetoric” (Csehi & Zigut 
2020: 2) of Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, to portray the EU as an “impe-
rial power” (Csehi & Zigut 2020: 2) that is controlled by the corrupt elite – and 
thus is naturally in conflict with the general will of the people. 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of our research was to investigate how the Government of Hungary 
framed its relationship with the European Union within the rather turbulent period 
of 2015–2017. Building on the assumption that conflict is a staple element of polit-
ical communication in general and populist discourse in particular, we hypothe-
sized that EU–Hungary tensions would manifest themselves in the communication 
of the Hungarian government via direct and explicit reference to the CONFLICT 
frame, more specifically in the form of a violent conflict, i.e., war.  
Drawing on a discourse dynamics approach to metaphor identification (Cameron 
et al. 2009, 2010), we analysed the metaphorical framing of the term Brüsszel 
(‘Brussels’) found in articles published on the government’s and the Prime Minis-
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majority (approx. 90%) of the examples were based upon the EU AS PERSON con-
ceptualization. This, in itself, is by no means particularly surprising, as political 
communication often relies on the use of metaphors that conceptualise a political 
entity, such as a nation, as a person (see Stanojević & Šarić 2019). This particular 
frame, however, manifested itself in the examples via four scenarios: AUTHORITY 
FIGURE, PARTNER, BULLY and OPPONENT IN A BATTLE, all of which showed relatively 
even distributions in all three investigated years.  
Counter to our initial expectations, the OPPONENT IN BATTLE scenario was the least 
frequent narrative in every single year that we analysed; instead, the EU AS AUTHOR-
ITY FIGURE conceptualization, based on a hierarchical model, emerged as the most 
frequent scenario. Nevertheless, conflict was present in every single scenario, alt-
hough to varying degrees (quite explicitly in the case of the OPPONENT IN A BATTLE 
and the BULLY scenarios, and in more subtle terms in the AUTHORITY FIGURE and 
the PARTNER scenarios). Our data indicate that the term Brüsszel has become a con-
venient shorthand in Hungarian government communication for conceptualizing 
the European Union as a somewhat difficult and authoritative individual with 
whom conflict is inherent – with varying degrees – at all times. 
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BRUXELLES – ŠEF, NASILNIK ILI VELIKI BRAT? 
UOKVIRIVANJE SUKOBA U SUVREMENOJ MAĐARSKOJ POLITIČKOJ RETORICI 
 
Gledano iz perspektive političkog realizma, sukob je osobina svojstvena svjetskoj politici 
(Morgenthau 1948/1973). Polazeći od ove osnovne premise, može se očekivati da političari 
rutinski koriste okvir SUKOBA kako bi objasnili i opravdali svoju vanjsku politiku (Musolff 
2016). Sukob je osobito raširen u populističkim narativima, gdje se „čisti ljudi“ uspoređuju 
s „korumpiranom elitom“ (Mudde 2004). U skladu s navedenim, pretpostavili smo da će 
aktualna mađarska populistička vlada svoj turbulentni odnos s EU-om isto tako oblikovati 
metaforički, konceptualizirajući ga kao nasilni sukob. Oslanjajući se na pristup diskursne 
dinamike u identificiranju metafora (Cameron et al. 2009; 2010), analizirali smo metafori-
čko uokvirivanje pojma Brüsszel (‚Bruxelles’) pronađeno u člancima objavljenim na služ-
benim web stranicama mađarske vlade u razdoblju između 2015. i 2017. Naši rezultati u-
kazuju na to da je eksplicitno jezično ostvarenje okvira OSUKOBA u obliku nasilnog sukoba 
(poput vojne operacije) u suvremenoj vladinoj retorici manje rašireno, za razliku od okvira 
EU KAO OSOBA. Ova potonja konceptualizacija, međutim, ostvaruje se kroz metaforičke 
scenarije koji evociraju konfliktne odnose različitih stupnjeva intenziteta (i tako nadograđu-
ju populistički narativ) prikazujući EU kao autoritarnu figuru, partnera u zajedničkom pot-
hvatu, nasilnika i protivnika u bitci. 
Ključne riječi: politička retorika; Mađarska; scenarij; SUKOB; okvir; Bruxelles; Europska 
unija; personifikacija, EU KAO OSOBA. 
 
